In the past decade or so, capitalism has seen a new wave of scrutiny. Following the disillusionment succeeding the 2008 financial crisis, new sprouts of anti-capitalist dissent have been popping up over the past few years. From 2011’s Occupy Wall Street, to the sudden popularity of democratic socialist Bernie Sanders in 2016, it seemed that critiquing the excesses of capitalism was back in vogue. In the wake of the barefaced flaws of the Trump administration, it seemed that a progressive, anti-capitalist revolution was just over the horizon. 

Yet here in 2020, with the rise of right-wing populism throughout the world, the failed “political revolution” of Sanders’ latest campaign, and the economic, social, and political instability wrought from the COVID-19 epidemic, this sentiment of revolution seems to be facing a sense of disappointment as people long to return to stability and the familiar (as exemplified by the nomination of Joe Biden for President). These global crises have revealed several fundamental structural inequalities within the capitalist system; most citizens are facing unemployment, insufficient health care, and an incredibly precarious balance between making ends meet and protecting their health as much of the country reopens while the richest among us are profiting off of this crisis (ie Bezos alone has amassed more than $25 billion since the beginning of 2020, greater than the entire GDP of Honduras). Much of the private sector (aka the stock market) is currently being propped up by funds directly injected by the state while the rate of poverty could soon reach its highest level in over half a century. Also, the current climate crisis looms just overhead, threatening to wreak havoc on both our ecosystems and economies unless we can mitigate and eventually eliminate our negative ecological impact on the planet. 

In the face of this widespread adversity, it's easy to see how most of us would be disillusioned with the future. Many of us are left asking: will capitalism finally come to an end before it ends us? In his 2020 book, Foretelling the End of Capitalism: Intellectual Misadventures Since Karl Marx, political economist at the Norwegian University of Science Francesco Boldizzoni illustrates that this question is not novel to our current political moment. Throughout his book, Boldizzoni shows us how intellectuals and economists have predicted the end of capitalism since the days of Marx and why their forecasts have fallen short as capitalism continues to trudge on. By analyzing Boldizonni’s pessimism regarding a revolutionary overcoming of capitalism, I propose that we may be able to get a sense of the disillusionment of a certain segment of the Left, and whether or not we should expect anything other than capitalism to shape our economic landscapes for the foreseeable future. 

Overview:

Structurally, this book is divided into six chapters, four of which are a historical/historiographical account of social forecasting and the prediction of the end of capitalism. As such, in these chapters, Boldizzoni takes us on a whirlwind trip through roughly 150 years of history, beginning with The Revolutions of 1848 through the early 1900s, the interwar period (1914-1945), the post-war period (1950s-1980s), and the rise of the New Right during the “end of history” era (1980s-present). Through these chapters, Boldizzoni gives us an overview of the various critics of capitalism from both the political Left and Right, ranging from Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and John Maynard Keynes to Francis Fukuyama, Slavoj Zizek, and Anthony Giddens. Along the way, Boldizzoni groups all of these thinkers (and many more) into four main categories, each differing in their social predictions regarding the end of capitalism: 1) implosion, 2) exhaustion, 3) convergence, and 4) cultural involution.

In the “implosion” school of thought (exemplified by Karl Marx and Rosa Luxemburg), capitalism will collapse under the weight of its internal contradictions. On the other hand, according to theories of exhaustion (illustrated by Mill and Keynes), capitalism will continue until it has fulfilled a certain quota of prosperity or runs up against an environmental limit, at which point it will die of natural causes. Those who advocate for a convergence theory (ie. Rudolf Hilferding and Friedrich Pollock) believe that technology and progress will ultimately force capitalism and socialism together, blending them until they become once and the same. Finally, believers in the cultural involution theory (Herbert Marcuse on the political Left and Daniel Bell/Joseph Schumpeter on the Right) posit that capitalism will ultimately not collapse because of its failures or contradictions, but precisely because it is too successful, ultimately stripping its subject of the moral convictions (aka. Protestant work ethic) that made it successful in the first place (or for Marcuse, such a move against traditional mores serve as a sign of liberation against capitalism). All of these theories are rooted in the original theses of Marx and were slowly developed accordingly over the past century and a half. Throughout this span of history, these economists and social theorists saw capitalism endure crisis after crisis, leading them to adapt their theories as capitalism evolved and survived. 

The final third of the book is dedicated to Boldizzoni’s concerns regarding the utility and purpose of social forecasting as well as his central thesis: hierarchy and individualism are crucial for capitalism’s survival and culture is the glue that holds all other institutions together. After elaborating on the four taxonomies of social forecasting that we have discussed above, Boldizzoni argues that they fail for a variety of reasons, including cognitive distortions, theoretical flaws, and its misplaced faith in progress. Boldizzoni then goes on to argue that Capitalism must utilize hierarchical social structures and individualism to sustain its three central foundations: 1) control of the means of production is in the hands of the few, 2) the allocation of goods and resources through free markets, and 3) a bourgeois culture that is fixated on the accumulation of personal wealth. 

Finally, one of the central reasons why social forecasters have failed to predict the end of capitalism, Boldizzoni argues, is that Marxists tend to downplay the role of culture. Culture is what ties all of these structures of society together, and as such, culture is slow to change and relatively autonomous. For example, according to Boldizzoni, while there is less inequality in Norway due to its historic lack of a hierarchical feudal system and the geographic necessity to form small, cooperative communities, countries that have a greater cultural inclination towards individualism and hierarchy (namely, the United States and Great Britain) will have a much more difficult time converting to socialism. Thus, because capitalism is deeply embedded in our culture, it will likewise take much time to change. As such, since capitalism is contingent on culture (and thus looks different according to different cultural contexts), we must be attentive to these differences, recognizing that these different flavours of capitalism depend on distinct historical and cultural contexts and adjust our approach to reforming them accordingly. 

Thus, when it comes to practical application, Boldizonni is rather pessimistic about the prospects of capitalism’s demise. From the outset of the book, he warns the reader as much, sympathizing with those who are frustrated at the injustice we see perpetuated by capitalism today, yet offering them no quarter in showing them the failure of previous revolutionaries who were likewise convinced that capitalism was on the way out. He believes that those who advocate for such a radical position are ultimately hurting the cause of the Left, as it “risks spreading false hopes while delegitimizing the reformist policies that are needed” (4). Ultimately, he wants those on the Left to set “realistic” expectations, encouraging them that while the overthrow of capitalism is next to impossible, that there’s still hope in reforming the system. He readily admits that this is unsatisfying, but that “if these future prospects appear to be illusory, then we would do better to focus on the present and improve life under capitalism...Coming to terms with reality is rarely a source of lasting satisfaction and is often a frustrating exercise that does not attract much sympathy, but it is the only reasonable thing to do” (234). 

Commendations: 

First of all, this book succeeds in presenting a fairly even-handed and concise history of capitalism from Marx to the present. Typically, books that take such a wide scope of history tend to gloss over and simplify much of the historical facts for the sake of the narrative. Boldizzoni condenses a lot of history into such a small size, and while he does sacrifice a bit of depth in the process, he still does a great job of giving one a basic overview of the key critics of capitalism through the past century and a half. Boldizzoni deftly summarizes the key ideas of thinkers from a wide variety of fields, ranging across philosophy, economics, sociology, and political science. The first four chapters of the book read more like historiography, not necessarily shedding new light on these thinkers, but rather systematically going through their various theories and showing how they predicted capitalism’s end within their historical contexts. 

Furthermore, in the latter part of the book, Bolizzoni makes a compelling case that it is almost meaningless to speak of Capitalism as a unified, autonomous system. Rather, we must speak of capitalisms (plural) and the various forms they take depending on their historical and cultural contexts. His case for the cultural roots of capitalism is also an important perspective to consider; the deeper capitalism is rooted in a particular culture, the more difficult it will be to pluck out and change. While Boldizzoni is pessimistic about radical, wholesale change, he does believe that capitalism will eventually end, just like every other system that humans have created. Boldizzoni, however, believes that it will not happen within our lifetimes and that whatever changes we do see to our current system, it will probably look more familiar to us than we expect. His perspective is a much-needed corrective to those who think that structural change will miraculously happen overnight, and who call for revolution without any definite plan. Boldizzoni’s realism/pessimism is still important for those on the Left to contend with, even if you don’t fully agree with him.

Critiques: 

However, despite Boldizzoni’s contention otherwise, I am not convinced that his simplification of the category of “culture” can hold the theoretical weight that he places on it. I understand why he does so. He is deeply pessimistic about revolutionary change but sees the different forms of capitalism that have emerged in different societies to reflect their unique cultures as a sign that capitalism can be shaped and molded into different forms (however slowly). Yet, could this evidence not point to the opposite conclusion: capitalism is ubiquitous in its ability to adapt and survive across various cultures? Culture, as a category, is incredibly complex, and analyzing the interplay between culture and other social relations, such as economics and politics is something that is distinctly lacking in Boldizzoni’s account. He views politics and economics as dependent on historical agents but then says culture is autonomous and relatively unchanging. This becomes problematic, for we can very well see how various forms of capitalism have significantly shaped elements of culture, such as the family unit, music and film, and even religious organization and expression. There is considerable overlap between these categories, and while I do agree with Boldizzoni about the difficulty of changing culture, his insistence on the inertia and autonomy of culture seems to be a bit overstated. 

Furthermore, while such an analysis might hold for more homogeneous societies, where cultural differences are minimal, how does Bolizzoni’s thesis hold up in a more culturally heterogeneous society, such as the US? Culture in the United States is not monolithic; many cultures live in and exist side by side in America, often in tension with one another. They have different structures, values, and unique languages that are shaped according to their experience, although nearly all of them have integrated the logic of capital. To be sure, while consistent ideological principles exist (at least idealized in the American mythos, such as individualism, freedom, and democracy), there is also a myriad of cultural expressions within the country, due to its large geographic scale and diverse demographics. Boldizzoni’s inflexible category of culture cannot contend with the wide variety of cultural expressions within such countries, nor give a sufficient account for capitalism’s integration into nearly all of them, different as though they may be. Essentially, one must determine whether A) capitalism operates under the umbrella and influence of culture as a noninvasive and reformable structure, or B) cultures are bent and shaped to accommodate the invasive logic of capital, thus ensuring capitalism’s perpetual survival. Boldizzoni takes the former position, acknowledging that while capitalism is indeed embedded in the social structure of some societies, “it is only embedded in them to a certain extent. In this, capitalism is no different from other institutional frameworks” (265). 

In a similar vein, while Boldizzoni insists that capitalism takes different forms according to culture, he insists that most other non-Western countries (such as China, Russia, Iran, Brazil, India, etc) “cannot be characterized as capitalist” (159). He tries to support this point by pointing out that China’s economy uses market mechanisms to “allocate resources to political ends within the framework of extensive state planning” (159). Regarding Russia, he argues that it is not capitalist because the GDP share of the public sector is as high as 40%, and the economy is not based on the separation of state and private ownership. Yet, I was left wondering why exactly these do not simply qualify as cultural variations of capitalism since they do not appear to be wholly different systems from what we see in the West. This begins to break down further once you consider Boldizzoni’s other thesis regarding capitalism: the necessity of individualism and hierarchy. Do not both of these nations also have an incredibly high rate of social and economic inequality? Is not the cronyism of Russian politics and economics not evidence of a hierarchical structure (just as we also see here in the US)? Are not the wealthy aristocratic classes of these countries motivated by the accumulation of personal wealth just as much as the US and the rest of the Western world? This supposed bifurcation between Eastern and Western cultures, and the insistence that they hold opposed cultural values that have either allowed capitalism to flourish or never take root, seems to be a bit of an oversimplification. 

On a structural note, while the book is organized well, the sources that Boldizzoni draws from are a bit homogeneous. While he does analyze thinkers from both the political Left and Right, they all tend to be older, white men (except for Rosa Luxemburg). There’s not a lot of engagement with how other thinkers that have historically been on the fringe of the predominant culture have forecasted the end of capitalism. That being said, going into this book, while Boldizzoni does a commendable job in summarizing these thinkers, it would help the reader to have a basic understanding of macroeconomics. While I do also find his dismissal of critical theory and poststructural a bit too blase, a deeper issue lies in the lack of counterexamples. While capitalism has continued to survive in the West, it did end, at least for a short time, in other places throughout the world, such as China, Cuba, Russia, etc. It might have bolstered Boldizzoni’s thesis to analyze what thinkers and economists in those countries tried to build, and why those ultimately failed and have been swallowed up by capitalism as well. While Boldizzoni champions a gentler version of social democracy, he is also a bit shy when it comes to admitting the areas in which it has also failed, blaming the decline of the US Left in the 1970s on greedy politicians and government inefficiency. Instead of grappling with some of the current political and economic issues facing social democratic societies (ie Sweden’s current fervid debates on migration policies, as well as some of the shortcomings of socialized medicine in France), Boldizzoni retreats to the realm of culture, defending social democracy on moral grounds. While this is a legitimate line of argumentation, I sincerely doubt that it would convince anyone who is already skeptical of restructuring our system under social democratic ideals. 

Conclusion: 

Overall, Boldizzoni’s book serves as a recourse (and perhaps a bit of a reprimand) to those on the Radical Left, warning them not to be too hasty in ringing the death knells of capitalism. Despite his criticisms of the failures of social forecasting and prophesying the end of capitalism, Boldizzoni can’t quite keep himself from offering his predictions. Capitalism is here to stay, Boldizzoni writes, although it can be slowly changed over a long time. Whatever happens to our current system in the coming decades, it will most likely look more familiar to us than not. Yet, while I do sympathize with Boldizzoni in his realistic and pragmatic approach, I can’t help but think that his social forecasting is a bit weak. 

While Boldizzoni does a commendable job in describing how we got to where we are today, his vision for the future seems ambiguous and frankly uninspiring. While Boldizzoni recognizes that capitalism’s survival is in large part due to its embeddedness in our cultural forms, he does not give us any real prescription of how to disentangle them. Boldizzoni believes that capitalism will eventually come to an end, but postpones its end to an indefinite future. In short, Boldizzoni’s theory is one devoid of what Badiou would call the Event, which is a rupture that redefines what is possible and restructures the coordinates of our being. Perhaps by first recognizing the differences and antagonisms between cultures, we can begin to see the cracks within the capitalist system that has accommodated itself to such disparate cultures. Through this tension, perhaps we might be able to see something new emerging just over the horizon.

In the meantime, I think that many of those on the Left are very well aware of the failure of revolutions against capitalism. From what I’ve been exposed to, most (sensible) Leftists aren’t motivated by vague notions of revolution, but rather are pointing out the excesses and injustices that are inherent within the logic of capital, calling on us to make a change before it’s too late. In the face of the growing rise of Right-wing populism, a sharp disillusionment and distrust with traditional social structures, and the looming existential threat of catastrophic climate disasters, many of the Left are fueled by a sense of radical urgency. 

As such, in our current world beset by administrations inept in their response to global pandemics, a great number of us see the structural weakness of capitalism. We see the stagnation of economies, as capitalism has fewer and fewer markets in which to develop and expand. While capitalism has often survived many crises throughout its lifespan, it is running out of available remedies. Perhaps it might take a catastrophic climate crisis to act as the Event that changes our very coordinates of thinking. But I am hopeful that we just might be able to avert catastrophe before it is too late. Predicting the future is always a messy enterprise. But if we follow Boldizzoni’s lead in analyzing our past, we just might make it to a future in which we are not concerned with mere survival, but can finally begin to construct a system in which we can all begin to thrive and flourish.