On February 22nd, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed his nation, announcing his plans to invade the sovereign nation of Ukraine. In a striking bit of revisionist history, Putin claimed two regions of eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk) as sovereign states, wholly independent from the Ukraine government. Escalating tensions, which had been brewing since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin declared Russian troops would be sent to the region on a “peacekeeping mission” to support the pro-Russian separatists who had been fighting in these regions.

Two days later, under the pretense of “demilitarizing and de-Nazifying” the Ukrainian government, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As I write this review exactly one month later, the Ukrainian military and voluntary troops are persistently fighting back the waves of Russian forces who continue to bomb and push their way into the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mariupol. Millions of refugees have fled the country and millions more have been displaced, creating one of the greatest refugee crises in Europe in the past century. Despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelinsky’s pleas for a no-fly zone and direct military intervention from Western allies, NATO has been careful not to escalate the conflict into a full-blown world war, choosing instead to impose heavy sanctions upon Russia and providing humanitarian and military aid to the Ukrainian people. 

In much of Western media’s analysis of the war, there is a tendency to conflate the Russian nation with the actions of its longtime leader, Putin. As such, Putin is often used as a figurehead to explain everything wrong with contemporary Russia. In the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, much of Western media has painted Putin as a megalomaniacal madman who has total control over the population of Russia, who are powerless to resist him. While this explanation has done much to unite the Western world in their support of the Ukrainian cause, it ignores the multifaceted ways in which Russia’s economic and political changes since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have led us to where we are today. 

In his 2018 book, Russia Without Putin: Russia Without Putin: Money, Power, and the Myths of the New Cold War, Tony Wood debunks several myths about Russia as he considers the political, economic, and social fluctuations of the Russian nation during the past thirty years. Utilizing a historical materialist analysis, Wood argues that, instead of embodying two starkly different political philosophies (Yeltsin’s free-market liberalism vs. Putin’s increasing statism and authoritarianism), these regimes are just two phases of a larger system (namely, a commitment to capitalism). Therefore, we need to look beyond Putin as a figure, because regardless of how and when he will leave the Kremlin, the system he currently presides over will most likely remain intact.

Overview: 

Wood, a contributing writer to the London Review of Books and a member of the New Left Review, argues that the West has often focused too narrowly on the figure of Putin. As Wood succinctly writes, 

My argument, rather, is that Western media coverage and analysis of Russia are overly fixated on Putin’s personality. Time and again, the characteristics of the man are used to explain the behaviour or interests of the state…Too much attention has been paid to the man, and not enough to the system over which he presides. The obsession with Putin’s persona effectively reduces a whole range of political, economic, and social questions to the swings of one’s individual mood or morality. (2-3)  

For Wood, the Western imagination has often over-relied on simple stereotypes and hackneyed Cold War-era myths about Russian society. Particularly, since the dissolution of the USSR, the West has typically drawn a stark division between the administrations of Boris Yeltsin (pres. 1990-2000) and Vladimir Putin (2000-2008 & 2012-present). In this book, Wood challenges this popular framework. 

During the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin and the Russian elite embraced capitalist “reforms” such as mass privatization and a dismantling of the state socialist system, which sent the country into an economic “shock therapy.” industries previously under state control were privatized and oligarchs who were either 1) formerly well-connected in the USSR (“insiders”) or 2) adept at exploiting the cracks of this new capitalist economy (“outsiders”) consolidated major sectors of the economy, most notably oil and natural gas. In this accumulation of wealth and power, these figures had a great influence on political policies and elections. Putin arose as a loyal and ambitious administrator who, compared to the unpopular and drunkenly incoherent Yeltsin, seemed an even-keeled and articulate figure. 

During the past twenty years, Putin has taken advantage of Russia’s abundant access to fossil fuels, as well as consolidated power through what Wood calls “imitation democracy.” Many in the West portray Putin’s consolidation of power and hollow democratic practices as a return to Soviet-era politics. Even Putin portrays himself as a figure who opposes the liberal West. Wood would beg to differ. Far from Putin’s reign serving as a radical departure from Yeltsin’s program of economic liberalization and openness to free-market capitalism, Wood argues that Putin has worked to consolidate and continue Yeltsin’s neoliberal privatization of the economy. The intertwining of government and private businesses, which was initiated under Yeltsin, was simply extended in Putin’s regime, as the concentration of wealth and power was concentrated into fewer and fewer hands. 

Another myth Wood discusses is the idea that Russia’s Soviet past has served as a constraint on the development of market reforms and capitalism in the nation. Against this, Wood argues that, far from the Soviet past constraining progress and the advancement of capitalism, it served as a ballast for it, maintaining older institutions while covering vast inequality under Yeltsin. Wood writes that the Russian population was able to endure crushing inflation and many other hardships that were brought on by the privatization of the economy due to the persistence of Soviet-era welfare infrastructure that, until recently, provided free healthcare and low rent. These two structures running side by side ended up smoothing the transition to capitalism and dissuaded any major opposition. For example, trade unions did not resist the liberal reforms of the Yeltsin era, as Wood writes:

Ultimately, the trade unions were a boon to post-Soviet capital and state alike; their dwindling relevance delegitimized the idea of unions in workers’ eyes, and at the same time they took up the space that a more independent, combative labour movement could have occupied. This is a very concrete example of Soviet-era institutions providing a subsidy to their capitalist successors, the maintenance of one smoothing the way for the establishment of the other. (76) 

This dismantling of working-class organizations -- as well as the power of the state apparatus to jail dissidents -- is one of the reasons why there seem to be very few Leftist alternatives to the Putin regime. 

Wood also deconstructs the myths and clichés of a “passive” Russian society. He highlights the various ways in which grassroots organizations and initiatives have mobilized to challenge the dominant powers in Russia, as well as how this opposition became increasingly fragmented in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Wood makes a distinction between liberals who held little state power calling for fairer elections and the leftist oppositions who wanted a fundamentally different system. 

He also makes a critical appraisal of Navalny, who is the current most prominent opposition leader. Wood discusses Navalny’s nationalist, reactionary character and essentially neoliberal policies, and argues that they represent a return to Yeltsin’s neoliberal project, albeit with more transparency. Thus, anti-Putin political opposition remains relatively weak throughout Russia, as it has had trouble connecting with the everyday concerns of the people. Wood speculates various strategies for a viable anti-Putin oppositional movement and deliberates how Leftists should approach Navalny. For any oppositional movement, Wood asks whether they should 1) denounce Navalny and alienate a swath of economically discontented, but socially problematic voters, or 2) embrace him in the hopes of channeling their discontent and energy into more progressive ends.

Finally, Wood turns toward foreign policy concerns, as he analyzes how the relationship between Russia and the West deteriorated. While many political commentators have described the escalating tensions between Russia and the West as a “New Cold War,” Wood seeks to debunk this myth, as he argues that neoliberal capitalism has become the dominant ideological paradigm on both sides. Wood points out the enormous imbalance of power between modern-day Russia and the West, which has made Russia nervous and uncertain of its place on the international stage. He is clear to make a distinction between honestly assessing Russia’s power (or lack thereof in comparison to NATO) and defending Putin’s actions, which he views as inexcusable. 

Yet, Wood believes this clash was more than likely inevitable, as the West has largely ignored, frustrated, or outright worked against Russia’s international interests. While in his early years, Putin maintained the pro-western position that Yeltsin initiated, NATO’s repeated expansion and intervention in former Soviet states while repeatedly denying Russia’s request to join has only served to rub salt into the wounds of Russia’s relationship with the West, in which Russia struggles with no longer being a global superpower. This is compounded by Russia’s over-reliance on oil and natural gas (non-renewable resources) as their central exports, which are becoming more and more unstable in a market that is moving toward renewable, sustainable sources of energy. 

For Wood, the straw that broke the camel’s back was the 2014 Maidan revolution in Ukraine, which Russia saw to be an illegal coup facilitated by the West. As a result, Putin decided to abandon his pro-western foreign policy and pushed back by annexing Crimea, a move that Wood describes as “improvisational” rather than a long-term principled strategy. This offensive move proved to be popular within Russia, especially among its nationalist and right-wing factions. Putin’s more aggressive stance has justified the West’s increasing support for sanctions against Russia and NATO expansion, and these same actions justify Putin’s ever more aggressive pushback and nationalist rhetoric to rally the electorate (ultimately resulting in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022). 

Wood argues that Putin’s ultimate goal is to stay in power for as long as possible, but it remains to be seen how long this will be viable, as Wood writes: “The very character of the system -- a predatory, authoritarian elite presiding over a vastly unequal society -- will inevitably generate further social tensions, sparking recurrent crises which cannot all be resolved by patriotic mobilizations or military adventures abroad” (171). While “imitation democracy” and the post-Soviet capitalism it was built to defend can survive in the short-term, whoever presides over it after Putin will still have to deal with the same internal issues plaguing the current Russian political and economic order. 

Commendations:

In the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia Without Putin serves as an imminent useful and accessible overview of Russia’s development since the end of the Cold War. Wood writes in a clear, concise manner, only occasionally dipping into more obscure language. Combined with its short length, Russia Without Putin is a quick, accessible, and urgently necessary read.  

Wood’s emphasis on the larger state apparatus beyond Putin is also a much-needed corrective to the typical Western understanding of Russian politics. For Wood, Putin as a person is not the main problem with Russian society. As such, if he were to leave tomorrow, what alternative could replace him that would meaningfully alter Russian society? Wood argues that there’s currently not a strong oppositional force to the Russian state apparatus and that the repressive power of the state is currently more powerful than the capacities of the population to resist it. By emphasizing the continuity of the Russian political system since the 1990s, Wood downplays the “great man” approach to historical analysis, choosing instead to focus on the material and ideological changes within post-Soviet Russia.  

This materialist analysis is especially important in light of the current war that Russia has waged in Ukraine. Wood points out that, despite the particularities of Russia’s political arrangement, we’ve seen an increasing accumulation of economic power in the hands of the few since the end of the Cold War. Given the Russian state’s project of mass privatization, it should come as no surprise that the Russian economy -- driven largely by a few crucial non-renewable resources such as oil and natural gas -- has been existentially threatened by a looming crisis. Yeltsin’s project of privatization led to severe austerity for the majority of the Russian people, while allowing the accumulation of profits and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few at the top. 

When Putin came to power, he continued Yeltsin’s policies, while taking control of several key sectors of the economy (oil, natural gas, aviation, finance, etc). Putin benefitted from high oil prices in the early and mid-2000s and became over-reliant on these resources instead of investing in other sectors such as technology. As a result of a growing call to divest from fossil fuels and invest in clean energy, Russia is now struggling to find profitable markets. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been taking advantage of its rich farmland and soils as it modernizes its agricultural and technology sectors, becoming less and less dependent on Russia. This has worried Russian politicians for a long time, and with the West slowly but incessantly encroaching on Russia’s border, Putin found himself in a position that would reward foreign aggression and expansion (at least by his calculations). 

This is indicative of capitalism in crisis, which often resorts to nationalism and imperialism to try to find a solution to its shortcomings. Back in 2018, Wood believed Russia would face an imminent collapse since it seems unable to break free from a system of elites that rule over an increasingly unequal society. While Wood predicted Russia could potentially partner with China economically (although be placed in a subordinate position), this possibility seems increasingly unlikely in the wake of new developments. Wood is correct: Leftists in Russia meed to mount a viable political alternative to Putin, addressing the Russian population’s social and economic concerns while refusing to lose itself in xenophobia or conservative ideology. Russia Without Putin reminds us that Russia is more than just Putin and to remember the struggles and political potential that actual people living on the ground still hold. 

Critique:

Relatedly, Russia Without Putin is much more focused on the political elite of Russian society than the average Russian citizen. This is not to say Wood doesn’t address how particular policies affected the average person and their material conditions. Rather, Wood’s analysis of the political elite means we see less of the real lives of Russian citizens and how they contribute to the social fabric of Russian society. 

To be fair, this may be beyond the intended scope of the book, but this also is a key component when contemplating how the Russian people could feasibly mount any form of resistance. There have been ongoing protests in Russia over social and economic issues, and this recent war against Ukraine has only served to politicize more and more of the population. In my estimation, it seems the conditions are ripe for the development of a viable left-wing movement in Russia. 

Yet, Wood’s strategic analysis of Navalny seems to be a moot point in the light of several events that have occurred in the past two years. After being poisoned in 2020 and then arrested, detained, and jailed in 2021-22, Navalny’s case seems to exemplify just how difficult it is to mount an effective opposition against Putin and the state apparatus he oversees. As recently as March 22nd (one week ago from when I’m writing this review), Navalny was sentenced to nine more years in a maximum-security prison. 

This further crackdown on political dissidents makes mounting a feasible alternative to Putin a fraught prospect. Wood’s work under analyzes the grassroots work being done on the ground, fragmented and disjointed as it may be. That being said, it is still a useful and necessary intervention to get us in the West to stop obsessing over Putin and start looking at the bigger picture of Russian society. 

Conclusion: 

Overall, Russia Without Putin is a timely and necessary reminder that Russia is much more than Putin. I would strongly recommend this book to anyone who wants a general overview of Russian politics since the fall of the Soviet Union to understand how we got to where we are today. Wood’s sharp analysis also serves as a useful primer for those who want to consider how to move beyond the current neoliberal society in which we find ourselves, and how genuine, transparent democracy can be extended to every sphere of our social and economic order. 

Russia’s current expansionism against Ukraine is typical of capitalism in decline, which, seeking a solution to economic and social problems, turns outward to nationalist and imperialist ideologies to cover its internal antagonisms. Even in a post-Putin Russia, the problems that plague Russian society will still be there, regardless of who is at the helm. Wood reminds us that the imitation democracy that exists there props up a nascent, neoliberal capitalism that is increasingly unstable. Putin’s newfound nationalism and expansionism will not be able to quell the social and economic turmoil that Russia now faces. Save for an intervention from another economic powerhouse such as China, Russia faces an ever-more precarious future. 

As the relations between the West and Russia deteriorate even further in the wake of 2022, those of us on the Left here in the West must always remember the people on the ground, both in Ukraine and Russia, who want nothing to do with this war and the imperialist ideological roots that spawned it. As such, Wood’s book is a timely reminder for us to remember to build global solidarity with all of those who are suffering under the rule of an unjust few.