Making Monsters: The Uncanny Power of Dehumanization - David Livingstone Smith
Published in 2021 by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
352 pages
ISBN:9780674545564
LCCN: 2021011261
LCC: HM1131 .S554 2021
From the horrors of lynching in the Post-Reconstruction South to the atrocities of the Holocaust to the brutality of the Rwandan genocide, the twentieth century was witness to some of the worst acts of mass killings in human history. In the aftershocks of such unimaginable violence, philosophers and theologians have tried to explain how one group of people could justify the mass extermination of another. To justify their violence, oppressive groups tend to utilize dehumanizing rhetoric in their propaganda to objectify and alienate their perceived enemies, often portraying the Other as animalistic or even monstrous.
As such, we must ask ourselves: “How and why do we make monsters out of other people?” In his 2021 book, Making Monsters: The Uncanny Power of Dehumanization, David Livingstone Smith (Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England) offers a comprehensive examination of the process of dehumanization. By digging into the psychological and philosophical roots of dehumanization, Smith aims to uncover and understand it as a unique and complex phenomenon, its deep-seated origins in the human psyche, and its immense power to justify violence.
Overview:
Most of us like to think we know what it means to treat or speak of someone in a dehumanizing way. Usually, we believe, it involves depicting them in ways that deprive them of their humanity, often by calling them names such as “dogs,” “rats,” “roaches,'' or even “demons.” Yet few of us consider how exactly this process of dehumanization works. Is dehumanization only done through speech, or does it include action? Do we dehumanize others by treating them as humans with lower status than ourselves, or do we see them as subhuman creatures? In this case, how does dehumanization differ from other forms of degradation, humiliation, and oppression, such as sexism, racism, and other forms of objectification?
Smith answers this by providing a meticulous and detailed account of the history and psychological processes of dehumanization. Smith is clear in his definition of dehumanization, as he writes,
My conception of dehumanization is simple. We dehumanize others when we conceive of them as subhuman creatures. These creatures might be nonhuman animals such as lice, rats, snakes, or wolves, or they might be fictional or supernatural beings such as demons or monsters. But in all cases, they are…“beneath” the human, even if, as is often the case, they are thought to possess greater-than-human powers. On my account, then, dehumanization is a kind of attitude. It is something that happens inside people’s heads. Of course, dehumanizing attitudes often give rise to derogatory speech and cruel or callous actions. But these forms of speech and these kinds of actions do not constitute dehumanization. Rather, they are the results of dehumanizing attitudes. (9)
For Smith, dehumanization requires one to simultaneously hold two contradictory beliefs. In the second Chapter, Smith disputes the claim that dehumanization is merely a metaphor. He claims instead that the historical and phenomenological evidence points toward the idea that while we, as humans, cannot help but recognize that another human being is indeed a part of our shared species, we can also fully accept ideologies that cast these figures as uncannily un-human. This contraction is often untenable and explosions of violence can burst forth from this dissonance.
In Chapter Three, Smith argues that dehumanization is not a result of external differences, but is rather an internal attitude that is justified post hoc by difference. While we cannot help but see another human as similar to ourselves, when we subscribe to dehumanizing ideologies, this sense of sameness serves as a mask hiding the true subhuman nature underneath. To illustrate this, Smith uses an example from literature: Kafka’s Metamorphosis. As opposed to the standard depiction of a dehumanizing figure, Smith writes, “Kafka’s story presents us with the inverse of dehumanization. When we dehumanize others, we conceive of them as having a human appearance that hides a subhuman essence, but in the story, Samsa’s human essence is concealed behind a subhuman appearance” (54). As a historical example, Smith uses the invention of race science and the perpetuation of biological folk beliefs about race and blood to discuss the psychological and social concepts of purity and defilement being transmitted through descent.
Smith develops this concept further in Chapters Four and Five, as he defines and dispels race essentialism. This is important because how we racialize others is closely connected to the process of dehumanization. According to Smith, both processes follow a similar pattern: whereas when we racialize the Other we view them as inferior human beings, when we dehumanize the Other we perceive them as possessing a subhuman essence, regardless of their human appearance. Both of these, Smith argues, are rooted in psychological essentialism (99).
In Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, Smith moves on to unpack and explain the concept of the subhuman (rather than simply nonhuman) as a key component of dehumanization. According to Smith, the creation of the category of the subhuman is dependent on the institution of hierarchical categories. He finds this basis in Western philosophy through Aristotle’s Great Chain of Being, a hierarchical order in which beings belong to superior and inferior natural orders. In this system, God stands at the top of the chain, with angels below Him, humans below angels, animals below humans, plants below animals, and minerals beneath plants (God>angels>humans>animals>plants>minerals). Smith reveals how the ideology of the Great Chain of Being has continued to proliferate throughout history, even until today. He also goes on to define what qualifies a being as human. In a dialectical move, Smith argues that defining humanity requires a foil: the subhuman.
This dichotomy is an ideological one, which he explores in Chapter Nine. Here, Smith is starting to define the ideological root of his theory of dehumanization. To use an example of how ideology comes to shape these socially constructed categories, he defines “nature:”
Nature is part of a conceptual, interpretive scheme that is imposed on the world (rather like lines of latitude and longitude are imposed on the globe). It is a term that gets put to a variety of uses to organize our large-scale conceptions of the world and the place of human beings and other organisms within it. And importantly, for the theory of dehumanization, it is often an ideologically loaded concept that is used to justify racialized and gendered relations of dominance. (118)
In his effort to define ideology, Smith focuses on the functional perspective of ideology, in which ideology serves primarily as a belief that produces or perpetuates oppression. This is further broken down into the distinction between causal and teleological functions of ideology (i.e. Is a belief ideological if it causes oppression even if it wasn't designed to? On the other hand, even if an ideology is explicitly designed to produce oppression, is it still ideology even if it doesn’t accomplish this goal?) (163). To overcome this impasse within a functionalist approach to ideology, Smith turns to evolutionary biology.
In the Tenth Chapter, Smith uses the extended example of the racialization and dehumanization of European Jews from the Middle Ages to the present to illustrate the ideological nature of dehumanization. By tracing dehumanizing tropes against European Jews such as blood libel from the Middle Ages to Nazi Germany, Smith shows that ideologies can stubbornly persist once they have been established, and that shifting political and social contexts can reignite latent dehumanizing beliefs (178). This is followed in Chapter Eleven by an examination of the psychological roots of dehumanization and how it eases the psychological strain that naturally comes with killing another human being. Smith argues that killing is incredibly difficult, as it goes against our human instincts to cooperate. Dehumanization eases this difficulty, as does obscuring the victim’s face before killing them. Smith utilizes the example of the visceral responses that Nazi soldiers had to mass killing their victims with pistols and guns, and how Zyklon-B and gas chambers were utilized to minimize this natural response to mass killings.
In the final chapter, Smith concludes by defending his theory of dehumanization and responding to potential critiques and objections (such as the claim that dehumanization simply doesn’t occur, and the role of demonization). Smith reiterates his thesis by arguing that dehumanization occurs when one individual regards another person as simultaneously human and subhuman. This incongruity of ideas, Smith recognizes, is a contradiction, and he recognizes the irrationality of human psychology. This is exemplified in the concept of the uncanny, as Smith writes,
A thing is uncanny if and only if it is a contradictory living (or once living) thing that violates the boundaries that we take to demarcate biological natural kinds from one another…Dehumanized people are experienced as uncanny by their dehumanizers, because they violate the human/subhuman boundary. They are conceived as wholly human and wholly subhuman, but these two representations of the dehumanized person cannot be reconciled with one another. The dehumanizer’s mind is pulled in two directions at once, and it cannot settle on either of the two mutually exclusive alternatives. The dehumanizer’s consciousness oscillates between them, thereby giving rise to the problem of humanity. (248)
This, however, falls short of explaining the problem of monstrosity, and how we turn the Other into monsters, who are outside of the natural realm. To explain why these uncanny beings are so disturbing, Smith turns to Mary Douglas’s concept of purity, which demarcates boundaries between clean and unclean. In Smith’s estimation, turning fellow human beings into monsters is a consequence of dehumanization rather than its purpose. While dehumanization aims to turn humans into animals, it cannot fully accomplish this goal, since we cannot completely shut away the instinct that tells us that another person is indeed human. Therefore, instead of making them into animals, we instead turn them into impure monsters, or wholly Other, who must be purged from the community and destroyed (255). When we call someone a monster, it is much more than a simple metaphor. As such, dehumanization is not simply something abstract; rather, Smith argues, it is a process that occurs in the mind.
Commendations:
Making Monsters is a thorough, accessible overview of the historical precedent, philosophical background, and psychological processes of dehumanization, differentiating it as separate and distinct phenomena from other processes. Written for a general audience, Smith’s account is not the deepest philosophical treatment of dehumanization, but rather an intermediate introduction to the political theory and intellectual history of dehumanization. Since there is little overly academic jargon, this read is ideal for the average reader who has little background in philosophy or psychology.
Even though it is relatively free from academic jargon, that does not mean that this book is not well-researched. On the contrary, Making Monsters is an incredibly well-sourced and meticulously argued account of the process of dehumanization. Since there is so much rich content to engage with in this volume, it would undoubtedly appeal to scholars as well. Smith approaches every topic with nuance and care and he logically organizes his argument, continually reminding readers of where he is going with his argument. He takes the complicated history and process of dehumanization and meticulously breaks it down into easy-to-follow steps.
While some of his arguments are more speculative than scientific at times, he is sure to back up his claims with evidence from biology, psychology, anthropology, history, and philosophy. I deeply appreciate this kind of interdisciplinary work, which makes this work all the more robust and convincing. Much to his credit, Smith also balances his argument with a healthy dose of epistemic humility. As he writes at the coda of the book, “ (276)
Additionally, Smith deftly utilizes tangible, real-world examples to ground his theory. Diving into the darkest impulses and histories of humankind (from spontaneous mob lynchings to systematic mass genocides), Smith points the reader to the real and present dangers of dehumanizing thoughts, language, and actions. By reminding readers of the deadly consequences of dehumanizing other human beings, Smith shows how a seemingly abstract concept possesses the real and lasting power to destroy. Smith’s work is most valuable in that it calls us to recognize when we (or those around us) utilize dehumanization, even in innocuous ways. We can see this in our contemporary political rhetoric today, where immigrants are referred to as “aliens” or “swarms” of migrants, and insert another example here. By recognizing dehumanizing rhetoric when it is used, we can be better prepared to resist its tempting allure.
Critique:
On the other hand, Smith’s volume suffers a few drawbacks. Since this book covers so much interdisciplinary ground in such a short space, there are some generalities for the sake of readability. For example, Smith’s description of the Great Chain of Being is a bit simplified and wholly taken from medieval sources. In his account, it places God as a perfect being at the top of the hierarchical chain, which sounds more like Anselm, Duns Scotus, Aquinas, and other Medieval Scholastic theologians and natural philosophers (which, to be fair, were heavily influenced by Aristotelian and Neoplatonic metaphysics). A lot of ground is covered in this brief book, and while he attempts to give a bit of depth to each topic covered, it can be a bit too much of a quick whirlwind tour of philosophical and psychological history/concepts, especially for the general reader.
While Smith’s meticulous approach is certainly one of the book’s greatest strengths, it is also a glaring weakness. Although his account is thoroughly argued, this comprehensive approach can make for a repetitive read, as Smith retreads ground several times to gently guide the reader through his arguments. He will introduce concepts in one chapter, assuring the reader he will explain them in more detail later. When he invariably does, he breaks down the definitions of terms he used earlier, instead of defining them from the outset. While this makes for an accessible read that doesn’t get too bogged down from the outset, it also causes him to repeat himself several times as he constantly backtracks to define concepts. I understand that this could be a purposeful way to work backward and dig deeper into the fundamental roots of dehumanization. Unfortunately, the consequence of this structure is that the book is a bit overly repetitive.
Additionally, Smith seems to be convinced of the originality of his analysis, when in reality there’s been a plethora of work about dehumanization within the fields of Holocaust Studies, Genocide Studies, and even Religious Studies (wherein my expertise lies). In the preface, Smith writes,
Strangely enough, there has not been much research into the nature of dehumanization. Most academic disciplines have all but ignored it and have treated dehumanization as though it were already well understood…It was the paucity of research into dehumanization, conjoined with its great importance, that inspired me to write my 2011 book…which remains the only interdisciplinary study of the subject in the English language (or, to the best of my knowledge, any other language) (xiii).
It might be fair to acknowledge that Smith’s perspective is unique in that he utilizes an evolutionary biological perspective to analyze the process of dehumanization. But to say that his work is the only interdisciplinary examination of dehumanization strikes me as a bit of hubris. It took Smith until the final chapter to introduce the concept of the uncanny, which is explicated in other works such as Timothy K. Beal’s Religion and its Monsters, Mark Fisher’s The Weird and the Eerie, and Eugene Thacker’s Horror of Philosophy trilogy. It would also have been interesting to tie in the concepts of liminality and spectrality within this analysis, even if this might have extended the book’s length to an unwieldy degree.
Conversation:
As Smith admits that this account is limited and invites scholars to augment and add to his analysis, I wanted to accept his invitation and add some possible further avenues of inquiry. Smith portrays dehumanization as a process that has inherently negative consequences. There are examples in literature, however, of human beings being positively (or at least more ambiguously) dehumanized. Various heroes and figures in world mythology are compared to the strength and bravery of lions, the beauty of swans, the quickness of stags, or the cunning of foxes. How do these positive traits correlate with Smith’s analysis of dehumanization?
Furthermore, it might have been helpful to analyze other examples of dehumanization in our modern society. For example, prisoners and convicted felons are often spoken of and treated in dehumanizing ways, as they have their rights stripped away from them. This dehumanization justifies a litany of abuses within our criminal justice system, often even the person accused of a crime is found guilty. Additionally, there is no mention of the ways in which Palestinians are routinely dehumanized by the Western world, which serves as a justification for mass displacement and wanton death. By incorporating these kinds of examples, Smith’s analysis could have had a greater degree of relevance to our contemporary society.
Finally, from a philosophical standpoint, I would be interested in holding Smith’s theory in dialogue with other theories of scapegoating, such as Girard’s theory of mimesis. Considering Smith’s account, it can seem like dehumanization is too often portrayed as an internal, individualist process. As such, the desire for conformity, theories of crowd psychology, and the illusion of authority are left unaddressed in favor of an individualist psychological account of the phenomena of dehumanization. Furthermore, by incorporating the psychoanalytic theory of philosophers and scholars such as Todd McGowan, we can further see the role of ideological contradiction as an ontological problem, rather than merely epistemological. By incorporating this collective, social process that undergirds dehumanization, we can further see the tendency to turn ontological contradiction (the Real) into external conflict, which the Imaginary language of dehumanization attempts to cover over.
Conclusion:
Overall, Making Monsters is a meticulously-argued, yet easily-accessible account of the complex process of dehumanization. While repetitive in places, Smith’s work proves to be a valuable contribution to the vast literature on how people have racialized and dehumanized the Other for devious ends. By pointing out the contradictions and paradoxes in dehumanization, Smith reveals how vulnerable we are to manipulative and dangerous rhetoric, and how we can better arm ourselves against such tactics. In a political discourse that is defined by polarization and dehumanizing language, it is now more important than ever to understand the psychological roots of dehumanization, and how we can resist it in all of its pernicious forms before it erupts in violence.